Volume 4
Issue 3 Fall 1964
Summer 1964

Malicious Prosecution—Necessity of Alleging Arrest or Property
Seizure—Exceptions
Theodore Parnall

Recommended Citation
Theodore Parnall, Malicious Prosecution—Necessity of Alleging Arrest or Property Seizure—Exceptions, 4
Nat. Resources J. 584 (1964).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol4/iss3/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

COMMENTS
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-NECESSITY OF ALLEGING ARREST OR

PROPERTY SEIZURE-ExcEPTIONS *-The courts disagree as to
what is necessary before a cause of action for malicious prosecution

of a civil suit will lie. The argument used most frequently against
these actions is that by injudiciously permitting them, the courts
would throw themselves open to every litigant who had been successful in a prior action brought against him.' As are most in ter-

rorem arguments, this is justified by looking to the underlying
public policy, which is held to be the undesirability of deterring an
honest suitor from litigating his rights out of fear of a later suit
against him for malicious prosecution. 2 One of the controlling
elements in determining whether or not to allow the cause of action
is the manner in which the malicious prosecution was carried out.
American jurisdictions are split on the issue of allowing a malicious
prosecution action without allegation and proof of arrest or seizure
of property, or special injury. A numerical majority,3 and the ReLandavazo v. Credit Bureau, 72 N.M. 456, 384 P.2d 891 (1963).
1.
If the rule were established that an action could be maintained simply upon the
failure of a plaintiff to substantiate the allegations of his complaint in the
original action, litigation would become interminable, and the failure of one
suit, instead of ending litigation, which is the policy of the law, would be a
precursor of another; and, if that suit perchance should fail, it would establish
the basis for still another.
Abbott v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 76 Pac. 302, 303 (1904) ; accord, Mayer v. Walter, 64
Pa. 283 (1870) ; Smith v. Hintrager, 67 Iowa 109, 24 N.W. 744 (1885) ; McNamee v.
Minke, 49 Md. 122 (1878).
2.
If such actions are allowed, it might oftentimes happen that an honest suitor
would be deterred from ascertaining his legal rights through fear of being
obliged to defend a subsequent suit, charging him with malicious prosecution.
Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 III. 619, 628, 51 N.E. 569, 571 (1898) ; Wetmore v.
Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 744, 18 N.W. 870, 871 (1884):

[T]here should be no restraint upon a suitor, through fear of liability resulting
from failure in his action, which would keep him from the courts. He ought not,
in ordinary cases, to be subject to a suit for bringing an action, and be required
to defend against the charge of malice and the want of probable cause. [Emphasis added.]
Accord, Abbot v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 76 Pac. 302 (1904).
3. Annot., 150 A.L.R. 897, 899 (1944) :
In what is at least a numerical majority of the jurisdictions, it has been
held that an action of malicious prosecution will lie for the institution of a civil
action maliciously and without probable cause, even though there has been no
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statement of Torts,' are in favor of permitting the action without
such an allegation.
Others, following the English example,- require
6
the allegation.
In 1943, New Mexico aligned itself with the so-called English or
"strict" theory and does not permit the action in the absence of a
showing of arrest or property seizure, or other special injury. 7 The
supreme court followed the public policy justification by reference to
the arguments of other courts.'
interference with the person or property of the defendant in the original suit
and no special injury is shown.
States holding that the allegations of arrest or property seizure are unnecessary are:
Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont. Id. at 899-900. The reason for the majority rule is
expressed by Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558, 560 (1897):
A wise policy requires that the honest claimant should not be frightened from
invoking the aid of the law by the statutory threat of a heavy bill of costs against
him in case of defeat. But certainly no such policy demands that malice should,
by the assurance of protection in advance, be encouraged to vex, damage, and
even ruin a peaceful citizen by the illegal prosecution of an action upon an unfounded claim.
4. Restatement, Torts § 674 (1938)
One who initiates or procures the initiation of civil proceedings against another is liable to him for the harm done thereby, if
(a) the proceedings are initiated
(i) without probable cause, and
(ii) primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the adjudication of the claim on which the proceedings are based, and
(b) except where they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in
favor of the person against whom they are brought.
5. Quartz Hill Consol. Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre, 11 Q.B.D. 674, 682-83 (1883):
[A]lthough civil proceedings are taken falsely and maliciously and without
reasonable or probable cause, nevertheless no action will lie in respect of them,
unless they produce some damage of which the law will take notice. . . . [T]he
'extra costs' are not damage caused by the unjust litigation, and therefore they
are not damage for which an action will lie.
6.
A suit for malicious prosecution of a civil suit without probable cause cannot
be maintained where the action upon which it is grounded is an ordinary civil
action, begun by summons and not accompanied by arrest of the person or
seizure of his property, or by special injury not necessarily resulting in any and
all suits prosecuted to recover for like causes of action. [Emphasis added.]
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Il. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668, 670 (1947) ; accord, Peckham v. Union
Fin. Co., 48 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1931) ; Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
Schulman v. Modern Industrial Bank, 178 Misc. 847, 36 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
States other than New Mexico that require the allegations before allowing the action
are: Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Annot., 150 A.L.R. 897,901-03 (1944).
7. Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310, 142 P.2d 546 (1943).
8. Id. at 313, 142 P.2d at 548, citing Abbott v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 76 Pac. 302
(1904):
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Having established New Mexico's position on the side of the strict
rule, the court's opinion is well supported by massive and respectable
authority.9 Despite equally impressive authority to the contrary, 10
the New Mexico rule regarding the necessary of alleging arrest or
property seizure or special injury was set forth in Johnson v. WalkerSmith Co." as follows:
[A]n action will not lie for the prosecution of a civil action with
malice and without probable cause where there has been no arrest of
the person or seizure of the property of the defendant, or where the
defendant has suffered no injuries except those which are the necessary
result in all ordinarylaw suits. 12 [Emphasis added.]
In Landavazo v. Credit Bureau,13 the defendant, Credit Bureau,
had written the plaintiff in 1955 in an effort to collect certain bills.
The plaintiff went to the defendant's place of business to settle the
matter. During the meeting, the defendant's agent and the plaintiff
discovered that the bills were owed by another person with the plaintiff's surname. The plaintiff was able to produce cancelled checks
proving that he had paid his gas bills and did not owe the Southern
Union Gas Company $49.50 as claimed by the defendant. The defendant's agent told the plaintiff that he would see that the records
were put in order. However, in 1959, when the plaintiff attempted
to buy a house, the defendant listed the $49.50 bill to the gas company in the credit report. Another agent of the defendant told the
plaintiff: "Whether you owe it or not, you should come and pay the
bill, it should be worth it to you paying $49 to get the loan through."
This statement was not denied by the defendant during the hearings.
The defendant proceeded against the plaintiff to collect this $49.50,
but later dismissed the action. The plaintiff then brought this action
for malicious prosecution. The trial court rendered a judgment for
While it is, no doubt, true that in some instances the peril of costs is not a sufficient restraint, and the recovery of costs is not an adequate compensation for the
expenses and annoyances incident to the defense of a suit, yet all who indulge
in litigation are necessarily subject to burdens, the exact weight of which cannot
be calculated in advance, and a rule must be established which, as a whole, is
the most wholesome in its effects, and accords in the greatest degree with public
policy.
The New Mexico court also used the policy arguments of the Peckham, Wetmore, and
Schwartz decisions, cited in notes 2 and 6 supra.
9. See note 6 supra.
10. See note 3 supra.
11. 47 N.M. 310,142 P.2d 546 (1943).
12. Id. at 316, 142 P.2d at 547.
13. 72 N.M. 456, 384P.2d 891 (1963).
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the plaintiff. On appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, held,
Reversed.1 4 The supreme court reasoned that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action in that it alleged neither arrest nor seizure of
property and was therefore barred by the rule of the Johnson case.' 5
Although the court's tone was one of regret, it considered itself
bound to apply the strict rule and dismissed the claim.
By refusing to consider the case on its merits, the supreme court
has offered collection agencies a benediction for any harassment that
they may heap upon innocent persons fearful for their credit standing. Although one might resist attempts at collection of a fictitious
bill by threat of suit, the knowledge that he may be forced to litigate
an unfounded claim without legal recourse against the agency may
influence him to pay a bill which amounts to less than the cost of
litigation. The supreme court, in Landavazo, stated:
[I]t would serve no useful purpose to restate the facts out of which
this suit arose. It is sufficient to point out that they clearly establish an
inexcusable and highly improper course of conduct, including recourse
to court procedure by defendant intended to force plaintiff to pay a
bill which he clearly did not owe.' [Emphasis added.]
With no restraint except the extortion provisions of the criminal
code," Landavazo appears to give collection agencies the opportunity to attempt to recover payment from one person the debt owed
by another. Such an obvious misuse of legal procedure is contrary to
public policy; it is apparent that the main argument upon which the
Johnson decision was based (the policy argument supported by a
minority of American jurisdictions' 8 ) shrinks in significance when
applied to the specific facts of Landavazo.
There are two lines of reasoning that would lead to a more satisfying result and yet not disturb the general rule established by the
Johnson case. The first approach is to rely upon exceptions to the
strict general rule. The foundation for this line of reasoning is re14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 457, 384 P.2d at 891.
16. Ibid. Having called the defendant's conduct inexcusable, the court then proceeds
to excuse it!
17.

Extortion consists of the communication or transmission of any threat to another by any means whatsoever with intent thereby to wrongfully obtain anything of value or to wrongfully compel the person threatened to do or refrain
from doing any action against his will.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-16-8 (Repl. 1964).
18. See note 2 supra.
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vealed by examining the rulings of jurisdictions that require the alleging of either arrest or seizure of property before the action will
lie. In several of these jurisdictions, the courts admit an exception to
this "strict" general rule and allow the action. Typically, the exception is recognized when the defendant has harassed the plaintiff by
bringing several actions on the same (unfounded) claim.' 9 However,
in Davis v. Boyle Bros., Inc.,2 ° a case similar to Landavazo, the action was allowed because the defendant knowingly prosecuted the
plaintiff for a debt that she did not owe. The defendant in that case
had similarly acknowledged the fact that the plaintiff did not owe
the money prior to bringing the action. Although the court relied
on the "multiple action" exception in allowing the suit, they stressed
the prior acknowledgment of the defendant as an important element
2
in granting the plaintiff relief. 1
It would seem to follow that the underlying public policy rule is
not inflexible. When a countervailing policy appears as it does in
Landavazo, other jurisdictions have been willing to depart from the
strict rule.
The other argument against the supreme court's dismissal is presented by the dissenting opinion in Landavazo. District Judge Gallegos, in his examination of the Johnson case, emphasized the exact
wording of the court's holding. The judge points out that in the
Johnson decision the phrases "prosecuted in the usual manner ' 2 2 and
"not common to the ordinary law suit" 2 3 are sufficient to distinguish
the cases. Similar wordings of other decisions relying on the "strict"
rule might support this reasoning.2 4 Landavazo is no "ordinary"
case, he argues, because the parties involved had unequal bargaining
power and the facts involve unusual public policy questions. The
Johnson case dealt with two parties and an action for "simple debt."
In Landavazo, the Credit Bureau existed primarily for the purpose
of collecting debts; it abused its privilege of litigation. Because the
Credit Bureau functions by means of legal proceedings to collect
19. American Optometric Ass'n v. Ritholtz, 101 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1939) ; Soffos v.
Eaton, 152 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Shedd v. Patterson, 302 Ill. 355, 134 N.E. 705
(1922).
20. 73 A.2d 517 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1950).
21. Id. at 520:
It involves something more than the usual suit brought maliciously and without probable cause. . . . [Ain employee of the store acknowledged the error
and promised that the suit would be dismissed.
22. Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310, 316, 142 P.2d 546, 550 (1943).
23. Ibid.
24. See notes 2 and 6 supra.
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debts, Judge Gallegos thinks it is not unreasonable to hold them to a
stricter standard than the defendants in "ordinary" cases.
Once the case is distinguished from Johnson, by either line of reasoning, the supreme court is free to reexamine the arguments for
both sides and reach a decision on the merits. This is infinitely more
satisfactory than the supreme court's weak protest that it is bound
by precedent and therefore must permit an undeniable abuse of the
legal process.
THEODORE PARNALL

